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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 16639 
CECIL EARL BROOKS and 
JAMES CHARLES EDWARD GOOD, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from convictions of Aggravated 
Assault in violation of Sections 76-5-102, 76-5-103 and 
76-2-202, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended), and sub-
sequent sentences. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellants were each charged with two counts of 
Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony, and were tried 
by a jury on July 16-19, 1979 in the Third Judicial District 
Court, in and for ~alt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge, presiding. The jury found 
each appellant guilty on both counts. Judgment on the 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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verdicts was entered and each appellant was sentenced to 
an indeterminate sentence of zero to five years in the 
Utah State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order from this Court affirming 
the verdicts of the jury and the judgments and sentences of 
the court below. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Respondent generally agrees with appellant's 
Statement of the Facts as far as it goes, with certain 
exceptions noted below. 
Prior to trial, on July 9, 1979, Judge Leary 
convened a hearing on the State's motion to introduce at 
trial the tapes of the preliminary hearing (R. 279-566). 
Detective Foster, South Salt Lake Police, testified 
at"that hearing that both victims had indicated they were 
going to stay for the trial (R. 285); that Vinson promised 
he would notify Foster of any change of address (R. 287); 
that as soon as Foster had any idea of a Bakersfield, 
California address for Storie, he contacted the Bakersfield 
police and the local bus lines in a vain attempt to locate 
Storie (R. 288-291) ; that he contacted all known relatives 
of Storie and left messages for Storie to contact Foster 
(R. 291-294) ; that he contacted likely hangouts in Fresno 
-2-
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and Sacramento all to no avail (R. 293) • 
Foster further testified that Vinson did contact 
him regarding Vinson's change of address (R. 295) and that 
after discovering that Vinson had left, he checked with 
the Assistance Payments Division and Salt Lake Rescue 
Mission , and searched Pioneer Park (R. 296-97). He also 
stated that he left word with Roper Yards personnel to notify 
him if they saw the witnesses (R. 297). 
Detective Foster also stated that at the time of 
him last personal contacts with either witness he had no 
idea of when the trial would occur and that he had followed 
up every lead he received (R. 328). 
Wendy Hufnagel, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney 
and Prosecutor in this case, stated that she had directed 
Detective Foster to follow any leads he had in attempting 
to"locate the witnesses (R. 330). 
The following additional testimony was received 
at trial: 
Larry Creason, a trainyard supervisor at Roper 
Yards, led the group of employees which first encountered 
the appellants after they had fled the crime scene. He 
testified that Good admitted the appellants were involved 
in the "fracas;" that Brooks said the cut throat (of Vinson) 
resulted from Good hitting the victim with the "pickax;" 
-3-
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and that Good stated that both victims should have been 
dead (R. 615-616, 633). Mr. Creason further testified 
that both appellants indicated they wanted to turn themselves 
in rather than run (R. 617). He also testified that Brooks' 
hand wound did not appear to be fresh and was not bleeding 
(R. 636, 638-639). 
Paul Midgely, a carman at Roper Yards was also 
with the group that stopped the appellants. He testified 
that appellants admitted being in the fight; that they stated 
they didn't want to run for the rest of their lives; and 
that they were surprised that the victims were not dead (R. 6li 
Scott Broussard, special agent for the railroad, testified 
that neither of the appellants appeared to be injured, but 
that Brooks did have blood on his hands {R. 700-701). I 
Dr. Mathews, an emergency-room physician from I 
Holy Cross Hospital who treated Vinson, testified that Vinson's I 
neck wound was life-threatening {R. 829). Both Dr. Mathews 
and Dr. Callister, an emergency-room physician from Valley 
West Hospital who treated Storie, testified to the effect 
that some of both victims' wounds were caused by a sharp 
instrument and others by a blunt instrument (R. 824-840). 
Dr. Mccloskey, University of Utah pathologist, 
testified that almost all of the articles found at the 
scene of the crime were stained with blood of a type 
-4-
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consistent with either or both of the victims, but with 
neither of the appellants (R. 849-888). 
Officer Crelly, South Salt Lake Police, testified 
that during the ride to the station following Brooks' arrest, 
Brooks stated he had hurt his hand that morning or the day 
before on a piece of railroad equipment (R. 999-1000). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION OF WITNESSES 
GUARANTEED BY THE CONSTITUTIONS OF UTAH 
AND THE UNITED STATES WAS NOT VIOLATED 
BY THE ADMISSION AT TRIAL OF THE PRELIM-
INARY HEARING TAPES. 
The fundamental issue in this case is whether 
appellants were denied their "right to confront the witnesses 
against [them]" as guaranteed by Article I, Section 12 of 
the Utah Constitution and by the Sixth Amendment to the 
Unrted States Constitution, by the admission at trial of 
the victims' tape-recorded preliminary hearing testimony. 
In other words, does the exception to the Hearsay Rule 
provided in Rule 63(3) (b) (ii), Utah Rules of Evidence, allowing 
the prior recorded testimony of an unavailable witness to be 
admitted as substantive evidence at a subsequent trial 
necessarily violate constitutional confrontation rights? 
Respondent submits that the answer must be in the negative 
based on the standards articulated by this Court and the 
-5-
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United States Supreme Court. 
The recent case of Ohio v. Roberts, ~- u.s. ~' 
100 s.ct. 2531 (1980), reiterates the two-step analysis 
necessary to determine the acceptability of prior testimony 
evidence in relation to confrontation considerations. First,' 
the witness must be unavailable; second, the testimony must 
I have been recorded under circumstances manifesting sufficientl 
I 
indicia of reliability. 
A 
THE PROSECUTION MET ITS BURDEN OF 
DEMONSTRATING THE UNAVAILABILITY OF 
THE WITNESSES. 
The threshold requirement for admitting at trial 
prior recorded testimony is that the party seeking to 
introduce that testimony has the burden of establishing 
the unavailability of the witness whose declarations are 
sought to be admitted. Rule 63 (3) (b), Utah Rules of Evidence 
In Roberts, the Court stated: 
The basic litmus of Sixth Amendment 
unavailability is established: 11 [A] 
witness is not 'unavailable' for purposes of 
the ••• exception to the confrontation 
requirement unless the prosecutorial 
authorities have made a good-faith effort 
to obtain his presence at trial. 11 Barber v. 
Page, 390 u.s. at 724-725, 88 s.ct., at 1322 
(emphasis added). • • [citations omitted]. 
-6-
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.... 
Although it might be said that the 
Court's prior cases provide no further 
refinement of this statement of the rule, 
certain general propositions safely emerge. 
The law does not require the doing of a 
futile act. Thus, if no possibility of 
procuring the witness exists (as, for 
example, the witness' intervening death), 
"good faith" demands nothing of the 
prosecution. But if there is a possiblity, 
albeit remote, that affirmative measures 
might produce the declarant, the obligation 
of good faith may demand their effectuation. 
"The lengths to which the prosecution must 
go to produce a witness ••• is a question 
of reasonableness." California v. Green, 
399 u.s., at 189, n. 22, 90 s.ct., at 1951 
(concurring opinion, citing Barber v. Page, 
supra). The ultimate question is whether 
the witness is unavailable despite good-
faith efforts undertaken prior to trial to 
locate and present that witness. 
100 s.ct. at 2543 (emphasis in original). 
The Court noted that the extent of the prosecution's 
efforts in that case included only talking to the witness' 
mother and issuing five subpoenas to the mother's address, 
knowing that the witness was not there. The Court then 
stated: 
Given these facts, the prosecution did 
not breach its duty of good-faith effort. 
To be sure, the prosecutor might have tried 
to locate by telephone the San Francisco social 
worker with whom Mrs. Isaacs had spoken many 
months before and might have undertaken other 
steps ip an effort to find Anita. One, in 
hindsight, may always think of other things. 
Nevertheless, the great improbability that 
such efforts would have resulted in locating 
the witness, and would have led to her production 
at trial, neutralizes any intimation that a 
concept of reasonableness required their 
execution. 
100 s.ct. at 2544 • Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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The Court went on to compare the factual situatiot, 
in Roberts with the prior cases of Barber v. Page, 390 
U.S. 719 (1968), and Mancusi v. State, 408 U.S. 204 (1972).1 
In Barber, a witness was held not to be unavailable when 
he was incarcerated in a federal prison and procedures exis 
to secure the witness' presence at trial. 
In Mancusi, the unavailable witness had 
his Swedish homeland. The Court held that he was 
unavailable because, even though his whereabouts were kno~, 
no procedures existed to compel his attendance at the second 
trial. 
The Roberts Court then concluded that where the 
witness' "whereabouts were not known and there was no assur 
that she would be found in a place from which she could be 
forced to return ••• the prosecution carried its burden of 
demonstrating that [the witness] was constitutionally 
unavailable for ••• trial." 100 s.ct. at 2544-45. 
This Court in State v. Oniskor, 29 Utah 2d 395, 51! 
P.2d 929 (1973), recognized that the burden on the State was 
to show "it had made a good-faith effort to secure the 
attendance of the witness and had been unsuccessful." 510 
P. 2d at 931. Rule 62 (7) {e), Utah Rules of Evidence, defines 
"unavailable as a witness" to include situations where the 
witness is "absent from the place of hearing 
proponent of his statement does not know and 
been unable to ascertain his whereabouts." 
-8-
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In Gallegos v. Turner, Utah, 526 P.2d 1128 
(1974), the admission at the second trial of an unavailable 
witness' prior testimony was upheld. In defining the 
extent of the State's good-faith due-diligence burden, 
this Court rejected any mechanical application of a 
prescribed set of steps to be taken in attempting to 
locate witnesses: 
It is true that many and various things 
might be done in attempting to locate a 
witness. Neither those listed in [Poe v. 
Turner, 353 F.Supp. 672 (D. Utah 1972)] 
nor, we assume, any other case, would be all 
inclusive or exclusive. The requirement is 
simply that the trial court be persuaded that 
the party (the State) has acted in good 
faith and with reasonable diligence and is 
unable to locate and bring the witness to the 
trial. The rule of review is comparable to 
that in most situations wherein it is the 
prerogative of the trial judge to make the 
determination. That is: he is allowed 
considerable latitude of discretion; and that 
his ruling will not be reversed in the absence 
of a showing of clear abuse thereof. 
526 P.2d at 1129-30 (footnote omitted). 
Poe v. Turner, 353 F.Supp. 672 (D. Utah 1972), was 
a habeas proceeding concerned with the efforts of the State 
to locate missing witnesses. The witnesses in that case were 
not transients, had former residence addresses and previous 
places of employment. They apparently possessed driver's 
licenses and owned vehicles registered in their names. Further, 
-9-
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the witness' relatives were all contacted to no avail. 
There were also reports that one of the witnesses may 
have been living in Chicago or New York, and that another 
may have been working for the City of Las Vegas and 
later, for a railroad company in the Midwest. Signficantly, 
none of those reports were followed up by the State. 
In concluding that the State had made a good faith effort 
to locate the witnesses, the court stated that those reports 
were not indications of sufficient 
substance as to be included within the 
necessary purview of a good-faith search. 
It was not necessary for the state to follow 
every single lead to its ultimate end. 
353 F.Supp. at 676. 
In the case at bar, the trial court was satisfied 
that the State had made a good faith effort to locate the 
witnesses (R.361). As noted in Gallegos v. Turner, supra,' 
trial court's determination of unavailability will be upheld 
absent a showing of clear abuse of discretion. Appellants 
cite numerous cases purporting to demonstrate that on the 
facts here, the trial court abused that discretion. 
Respondent submits that all of those cases are distinguishab! 
Appellants liken the present case to Fresneda v. s· 
Alaska, 483 P.2d 1011 (1971). However, in that case, the 
missing witness had definitely joined the Army and like in 
Barber v. Page, supra, official procedures existed to locate 
-10-
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and return the missing witness. 483 P.2d at 1018, fn. 26. 
Further, the lack of diligence was held to be harmless 
error where other evidence was sufficient to uphold the 
conviction. 
Appellants also cite People v. Horn, 36 Cal.Rptr. 
903 (1964), to show the importance of the time lapse between 
knowledge of a witness' absence and the start of the search to 
locate him. The court did indeed recognize that the time 
lapse was important, but then pointed out that that was only 
one factor to be considered. The prior cooperation of the 
witnesses was also a factor to consider. 
Similarly in the present case, both the witnesses 
had indicated their intention to stay and Vinson had 
promised to notify Detective Foster of any change of 
address. Respondent suggests that it was not unreasonable 
to. assume that either or both witnesses would return for 
the trial based not only on their prior statements, but 
also on the apparent easy availability of support and 
lodging from Assistance Payments and St. Mary's Home. 
People v. Starr, 89 Mich.App. 342, 280 N.W.2d 
519 (1979), is cited by appellants as requiring that all 
specific leads and reasonable alternatives be pursued. 
The missing witness in that case was a potential co-defendant 
and a local resident. Further, as appellants recognize, 
there were other individuals present at the incident and 
the local police were well acquainted with the participants. 
-11-
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Respondent would agree that had other participants been 
available in the present case and had any local officials 
had familiarity with the witness' movements, those leads 
should have been checked out. Indeed, all other witnesses 
to any of the events on the night of the assault were 
produced at trial. Further, all possible leads to the 
witnesses' whereabouts were checked out up to and 
including the beginning of trial. 
The "most specific lead ••• not checked out 
by the prosecutor" in People v. Mcintosh, 389 Mich. 82, 
204 N.W.2d 135 (1973), which appellants cite, was the 
distinct possiblity that the unavailable witness was in 
a North Carolina prison whose authorities were never 
contacted by the prosecution. Suffice to say no such 
specific lead existed in the present case. 
Appellants cite State v. Greer, 27 Ariz.App. 
197, 552 P. 2d 1212 (197 6) , to suggest that the prosecutor 
in the instant case was negligent in failing to supervise 
the efforts to locate the missing witnesses. In the ~ 
case, there was a six month lag between knowing of the 
witness' unavailability and the beginning of trial. During 
that six month period no effort at all was made to locate 
the witness, including no checks with his employer, his 
mother or his sister-in-law. Further, no attempt was 
-12-
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made to check any forwarding address from his address 
at the time of the preliminary hearing. The court favorably 
cited Poe v. Turner, supra, for examples of the sorts Of 
things that could be done to demonstrate good-faith 
attempts to locate a missing witness. 
The case of Peo;ele v. Rogers, 79 Ill.App.3d 
745, 398 N.E.2d 1058 (1979), is inappropriately cited by 
appellants. In that case, the missing witness was one 
of the co-defendants who had testified at the preliminary 
hearing on behalf of herself and the other defendants as 
to possible justification for the robbery. The remaining 
defendants attempted to introduce this absent defendant's 
testimony at trial. The defense made eight or ten phone 
calls, had indeed contacted the witness-defendant two or 
three times and was still unable to offer an explanation 
fO'r her absence. Respondent agrees that had any 
telephone contact been made with the witnesses here, or 
anyone who had a reasonable idea as to their location, 
the State would have had to do more. However, no contacts 
of that sort were made or ignored. 
Appellants place heavy emphasis on the fact that no 
subpoena to Donald Storie was ever issued. They do not 
suggest, however, where this subpoena could have been served. 
The lack of importance of a worthless subpoena was recently 
-13-
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discussed in People v. Forgason, 99 Cal.App.3d 361, 160 
Cal.Rptr. 263 (1979). There, the State was challenging 
the good faith effort of the defense to secure unavailable 
witnesses. Although, as the court noted, the burden to 
show good faith is considerably heavier on the prosecution 
than on the defense, the value of a subpoena issued for a 
known-to-be-unavailable witness is equally worthless: 
[L]ittle, if any, importance will be 
placed upon the pro forrna act of delivering 
a subpoena "in a timely fashion to the 
sheriff for service upon the missing witness," 
when the party is unable to suggest a place 
where he may be served ••• And "'no good 
could be accomplished by requiring that 
an officer. • .make a pretense of looking 
for the witness in a number of places where 
he could not reasonably be expected to be 
found. • • • '" 
[A]n "idle" and "pro forrna" requirement 
• • • accomplished "'no good'" and is manifestly 
unreasonable. 
160 Cal.Rptr. at 266-267 (citations omitted). 
Appellants next assert that the State "had reason 
to know that Vinson and Storie had no intention of remainin! 
in Salt Lake for any extended time, especially since neither 
had sought employment." (App. Brief. at 27). On the 
contrary, as already demonstrated, the State did have 
reasonable expectations that the witnesses would remain 
for the trial. Their failure to obtain employment would 
seem more reasonably explainable on the basis of the seriou. 
ness of the wounds inflicted by the appellants than on any 
preconceived plans to leave town. 
-14-
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Flores .v. People, Colo., 593 P.2d 316 (1978), cited 
by appellants, is initially distinguishable from the instant 
case on the basis that there it was indeed likely, four 
months before trial, that the witness would be dead or 
incapacitated by the time of trial. Further, as will be 
discussed below in Part B of Point I, a preliminary 
hearing in Colorado may not offer sufficient indicia of 
reliability to justify admission of that testimony at 
trial, and therefore a deposition may be the only 
appropriate way to preserve testimony in that jurisdiction. 
That preliminary hearing testimony in Utah is 
sufficiently reliable generally, and clearly was in this 
case, will be demonstrated below in Part B. Suffice to 
say here that the testimony of the witnesses was 
adequately preserved via the preliminary hearing tapes. 
Appellants question the lack of requiring 
bonds or surety deposits from these witnesses pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-15-25 and 26 (repealed), in force at 
the time. Respondent suggests that the committing magistrate, 
along with the State, had reasonable expectations that the 
witnesses would appear for trial. Thus, there was 
insufficient reason to require a bond in this case. 
Finally, appellants cite People v. Enriquez, 
137 Cal.Rptr. 171, 561 P.2d 261 (1977), to suggest, once 
-15-
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more, the allegation that the State did not make a good 
faith effort to locate the missing witnesses. In that 
case, the State offered no testimony on the issue of 
due diligence, and the defense offered·testimony from 
the witness' mother to the effect that she could have 
located the witness but the prosecution made little, 
if any, attempt to elicit the information from her. 
The Court characterized the prosecution's efforts as 
one of "casual indifference." 
Respondent submits that instead of "casual 
indifference" and the refusal to check reasonable leads, 
the State's efforts in the present case more nearly 
resemble the efforts made by the prosecution in State v. 
Anderson, 42 Or.App. 29, 599 P.2d 1225 (1979), cited 
favorably by appellants (App. Brief at 28). The 
witnesses in that case, like Vinson and Storie and 
unlike the witness in Enriquez, were truly transient 
and had no relations and few friends on the scene. 
(Indeed, Vinson and Storie could fairly be said to have 
had no contacts at all in the area, except for the 
appellants themselves.) The efforts made to locate those 
witnesses in Anderson included only checking their last 
known addresses, making a futile call to Los Angeles 
based on a sketchy report that they had gone someplace 
in that area, and in the case of one of the witnesses, 
talking with friends who had not seen him for a few months. 
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As the Court put it: 
The itinerant lifestyle of these 
witnesses made it much more difficult to 
track them down because they left few 
tracks. They maintained no permanent 
employment, had no permanent residence 
in the area and left no forwarding address. 
599 P.2d at 1228. 
Respondent submits that not only have appellants 
failed to show that Judge Leary committed a clear abuse of 
discretion in finding that the State made a good-faith 
due-diligence effort to locate the missing witnesses, but 
that any reasonable reading of the facts inexorably leads 
to the conclusion that Vinson and Storie were constitutionally 
"unavailable" at the time of trial. 
B 
THE PRELIMINARY HEARING TESTIMONY 
WAS OBTAINED UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES 
BEARING SUFFICIENT INDICIA OF 
RELIABILITY TO BE ADMISSIBLE AT 
TRIAL. 
Appellants recognize early in their argument that 
Ohio v. Roberts, U.S. , 100 s.ct. 2531 (1980), and 
its precursors are adversely dispositive of the issue of the 
reliability of the preliminary hearing tapes and the 
propriety of thei~ admission at trial once unavailability of 
the witnesses has been demonstrated (App. Brief at 7 and 29). 
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Appellants proceed, however, to ask this Court to declare 
that either generally, preliminary hearing testimony is 
so inherently unreliable as to render it inadmissible at 
trial, or specifically, that the preliminary hearing 
testimony in this case is so inherently unreliable as 
to render it inadmissible. 
Respondent initially agrees that Ohio v. Roberts, 
supra, is indeed dispositive of the reliability issue. While 
reaffirming the fundamental importance of confrontation at 
trial, the Court n,o:ted that it has 
recognized that competing interests, if 
"closely examined," Chambers v. Mississippi, 
410 u.s., at 295, 93 s.ct., at 1045, 
may warrant dispensing with confronta-
tion at trial. See Mattox v. United 
States, 156 u.s., at 243, 15 s.ct. 
at 340 ("general rules of law of this kind, 
however beneficent in their operation and 
valuable to the accused, must occasionally 
give way to considerations of public policy 
and the necessities of the case"). Signi-
ficantly, every jurisdiction has a strong 
interest in effective law enforcement, and 
in the development and precise formulation 
of the rules of evidence applicable in 
criminal proceedings. 
100 s.ct. at 2538. The Court went on to set out the 
necessary requirements for admitting prior testimony: 
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In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not 
present for cross-examination at trial, the 
Confrontation Clause normally requires a 
showing that he is unavailable. Even then, 
his statement is admissible only if it bears 
adequate "indicia of reliability." Reliability 
can be inferred without more in a case where the 
evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay 
exception. 
100 s.ct. at 2539 (emphasis added). 
In Roberts, the unavailable witness, Anita Isaacs, 
was a friend of the defendant's who the defendant called as his 
witness at the preliminary hearing in an attempt to show that 
he had permission to use the credit cards and checks he was 
convicted of stealing and forging. Anita denied that assertion. 
Defense counsel did not ask that she be declared hostile nor 
that he be allowed to cross-examine her. At trial, Anita 
was declared "unavailable" and her preliminary hearing 
testimony was admitted over defendant's objections. 
In upholding the trial court's admission of the 
testimony, and reversing the Ohio supreme Court, the Court 
refused to distinguish "preliminary hearing testimony previously 
subjected to cross-examination from previously cross-examined 
prior-trial testimony." 100 s.ct. at 2542. 
The foundation had been laid long ago for the clear 
holding in Roberts that no principled distinction exists between 
cross-examined preliminary hearing testimony and trial 
testimony. As the Court stated in California v. Green, 399 
U.S. 163, 90 S.Ct. 1930 (1970): 
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This Court long ago held that 
admitting the prior testimony of an 
unavailable witness does not violate 
the Confrontation Clause. Mattox v. 
United States, 156 U.S. 237, 15 S.Ct. 337, 
39 L.Ed. 409 (1895). That case involved 
testimony given· at the defendant's first 
trial by a witness who had died by the time 
of the second trial, but we do not find 
the instant preliminary hearing significantly 
different from an actual trial to warrant 
distinguishing the two cases for purposes 
of the Confrontation Clause. Indeed, we 
indicated as much in Pointer v. Texas, 380 
u.s. 400, 407, 85 s.ct. 1065, 1069 (1965), 
where we noted that "[t]he case before us would 
be quite a different one had Phillips' statement 
been taken at a full-fledged hearing at which 
petitioner had been represented by counsel who 
had been given a complete and adequate 
opportunity to cross-examine." And in 
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725-726, 88 
s.ct. 1318, 1322 (1968), although noting that 
the preliminary hearing is ordinarily a less 
searching exploration into the merits of a 
case than a trial, we recognized that "there 
may be some justification for holding that 
the opportunity for cross-examination of a 
witness at a preliminary hearing satisfies 
the demand of the confrontation clause where 
the witness is shown to be actually unavailable 
* * *." In the present case respondent's counsel 
does not appear to have been significantly limited 
in any way in the scope or nature of his cross-
examination of the witness Porter at the pre-
liminary hearing. If Porter had died or was 
otherwise unavailable, the Confrontation Clause 
would not have been violated by admitting his 
testimony given at the preliminary hearing--
the right of cross-examination then afforded 
provides substantial compliance with the purposes 
behind the confrontation requirement, as long as 
the declarant's inability to give live testimony 
is in no way the fault of the State. 
399 U.S. at 165-166, 100 S. Ct. at 1939. 
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This Court has recently recognized that a preliminary 
hearing in Utah affords criminal defendants adequate protection 
of their right to confrontation. State v. Anderson, Utah, 612 
P. 2d 778 (1980) (same case as "State v. Brackenbury," App. 
Brief at 16). In Anderson, this Court stated: 
[T]he adversarial qualities of the 
examination allow the defendant an 
opportunity to attack the prosecution's 
evidence and to present any affirmative 
defenses. Although the hearing is not a 
trial per se, it is not an ex parte 
proceeding nor one-sided determination of 
probable cause, and the accused is granted 
a statutory right to cross-examine the 
witnesses against him, and the right to 
subpoena and present witnesses in his 
defense. Thus, the preliminary examination 
is an adversarial proceeding in which 
certain procedural safeguards are recognized 
as necessary to guarantee the accused's 
substantive right to a fair hearing. 
612 P.2d at 783 (footnotes omitted). 
The Anderson case was concerned with the admission 
at the preliminary hearing of an absent witness' affidavit 
to support a finding of probable cause. In ruling that 
confrontation rights demanded the witness' presence at the 
hearing, it was said: 
The adversarial nature of the preliminary 
hearing is conducive to the imposition of 
these procedural safeguards. The application 
of the right of cross-examination, and the 
exclusion of certain out of court statements 
at this stage of the criminal prosecution 
insures essential protection of the defendant's 
substantive rights. 
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Specifically, the cross-examination of 
witnesses presenting testimony against the 
accused at the hearing provides a means of 
attacking their credibility and thus the 
substance of their testimony. In a proceeding 
such as the preliminary examination, where the 
credibility of the witnesses is an important 
element in the determination of probable 
cause, the recognition of a procedural right 
of cross-examination is essential to the 
preservation of a fair hearing. 
612 P.2d at 786 (footnote omitted). (Contrast Flores v. Peal 
Colo, 593 P.2d 316 (1978), and People v. Smith, Colo, 597 
P.2d 204 (1979), where the Colorado Supreme Court determined 
that, unlike Utah, Colorado preliminary hearings are 
severely limited in the protections provided to defendants.) 
The Court's attention is called to the Transcript 
of Preliminary Hearing (R.158-278). Respondent submits that 
not only were appellants given adequate opportunity to 
cross-examine the two witnesses but that they took full 
advantage of that opportunity. Mr. Iwasaki, counsel for 
appellant Brooks at the preliminary hearing and at trial, 
thoroughly cross-examined the witness Storie. Indeed, 
the 38 pages of the transcript are replete with 
appropriately hostile and argumentative questions designed 
to break down the victim's story (R.172-210). Ms. Pixton, 
appellant Good's counsel at the hearing and at trial, 
consumed 27· pages of transcript during her cross-examination 
of Storie, similarly attempting to shake his story (R.210-
237). By comparison, the direct examination of Storie by M5· 
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Hufnagel consists of only 11 pages (R.161-72). The 
cross-examination of the witness Vinson by Mr. Iwasaki 
covers 21 pages of transcript (R.244-64), and by Ms. 
Pixton, 11 pages (R.265-275). Vinson's direct testimony 
is contained in seven pages (R.238-44). Respondent submits 
that not only was the cross-examination thorough, but that 
it is difficult to imagine any more potentially searching 
and effective questioning that could have taken place at 
trial. (See People v. Garcia, 65 Ill.App.3d 13, 302 N.E.2d 
316 (1978), where relief was denied when further cross-
examination would have been of no benefit.) 
Appellants also contend that they were denied 
due process by the trial court's refusal to hold a hearing 
on the reliability of the recorded testimony. Respondent 
confesses confusion as to what the appellants are asking 
for here. Respondent suggests that "indicia of reliability" 
are those factors identified by the United States Supreme 
Court in Green and Roberts, and by this Court in Anderson, 
and include: 
. • • circumstances closely approximating 
those that surround the typical trial. Porter 
was under oath; respondent was represented by 
counsel--the same counsel in fact who later 
represented him at the trial; respondent 
had every opportunity to cross-examine Porter 
as to his statement; and the proceedings were 
conducted before a judicial tribunal, equipped 
to provide a judicial record of the hearings. 
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 
1938 (1970). Further, at the Hearing on Motions, defense 
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counsel agreed that part of the purpose of that hearing was 
to determine the reliability of the testimony (R.508). It 
should also be noted that Judge Leary made every effort 
to insure that the tapes were indeed reliable when he allowec 
defense counsel to make original substantive objections to 
the testimony in the tapes when the tapes were played at the 
Hearing on Motions (R.507). Indeed, the tapes admitted at 
trial had been edited to delete objectionable statements. 
Appellants further urge that the demeanor, i.e., 
the "sweaty brow" and "seedy appearance," of the witnesses 
here was so necessary to the jury's weighing of credibility 
as to render its absence fatal to the State's case. 
Appellant's cite no authority for this proposition. 
Respondent agrees that witness demeanor is important, however, 
it is submitted that in no case has the mere absence of 
demeanor evidence been deemed dispositive. Indeed, the fact 
that the jury was able to hear the actual testimony and 
cross-examination appears to make these tape recordings more 
inherently reliable than the dry reading of transcript in 
the usual case of this kind. (See State v. Oniskor, supra, 
and Gallegos v. Turner, supra, where it appears that this 
Court presumed the reliability of prior recorded testimony 
and was concerned only with the unavailability question.) 
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Respondent suggests that in this case the State 
also would have preferred the in-court trial testimony 
of the witnesses. It is certainly reasonable to assume 
that the witnesses' absence raised initial doubts and 
questions in the jurors' minds as to the basic credibility 
of the witnesses. Further, the State was deprived of 
rather grisly, but effectively demonstrative direct 
evidence of the nature of the wounds inflicted by 
appellants. 
None of the cases cited by appellants compel 
this Court to find other than that the reliability of 
the recorded testimony was sufficiently established to justify 
its admission at trial. 
For example, State v. Smyth, 286 Or. 293, 593 P.2d 
1166 (1979), turned on the issue of unavailability, not the 
lack of face-to-face confrontation at trial. There the 
State made absolutely no effort to obtain the voluntary 
attendance at trial of a witness who, although living in 
a foreign country, was nevertheless only a short distance 
away in Canada and probably made the trip "a dozen times 
a year." 
Appellants also cite People v. Gibbs, 63 
Cal.Rptr. 471 (1968), for the proposition that preliminary 
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hearing testimony may be inherently unreliable because 
of the difference in the nature of cross-examination. 
The missing witness in that case was a police informer 
who made a narcotics purchase from the defendant, and 
who was facing possible criminal charges himself. The 
most important factor cited by the court in finding that 
a denial of confrontation had occurred was that defense 
counsel had been appointed only five minutes before the 
hearing. Although counsel did cross-examine the witness, 
the court found that the "[b]are existence of an 
opportunity for cross-examination ••• " id. at 474, did 
not amount to a "complete and adequate opportunity for 
cross-examination." Id. at 476. Respondent reiterates 
that the preliminary hearing cross-examination in 
the instant case clearly amounted to an adequate opportunity 
fot, and indeed, a thorough exercise of, complete and 
adequate cross-examination. 
Respondent submits that appellants have failed 
to demonstrate that prior recorded testimony from pre-
liminary hearings in general, or from the preliminary hearin! 
in this case, is so inherently unreliable as to preclude itS 
admission at trial. 
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POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED WAS SUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE VERDICT OF THE JURY. 
This Court recently restated the standard of 
review it would apply to claims of insufficiency of 
the evidence: 
It is the exclusive function of the 
jury to weigh the evidence and to determine 
the credibility of the witnesses, and it is 
not within the prerogative of this Court 
to substitute its judgment for that of 
the fact-finder. This Court should only 
interfere when the evidence is so lacking 
and insubstantial that reasonable men 
could not possibly have reached a verdict 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
State v. Lamm, Utah,606 P.2d 229, 231 (1980). That case 
cited numerous other cases as standing for the same 
proposition. Id. at 231, fn. 2. State v. Reddish, Utah, 
550 P.2d 728 (1976), held that where the defendant's 
version of the story differs from the State's, the court 
must assume that the jury believed that version which 
supports their verdict. 
In the present case, contrary to appellant's 
assertions, the jury was presented with far more than a 
mere "choice between two far-fetched accounts of an 
evening's events." (App. Brief 35). Not only was there 
the reliably recorded prior testimony of the unavailable 
witnesses, but as noted above in the Statement of Facts, 
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the equally damaging testimony of the other witnesses 
at the general scene of the crime and of the pathologist. 
That other testimony not only cast serious doubt on 
appellant's self-defense theory, it also strongly 
corroborated the victim's accounts of the "evening's events.' 
It seems apparent, then, that the evidence here 
is not so lacking and insubstantial that the jury must 
necessarily have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
appellants conunitted the crime. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE APPELLANTS' 
INSTRUCTION NO. 23 WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION. 
Appellants requested the giving of their 
Instruction No. 23, which reads, in pertinent part, thus: 
The absence of a testifying witness 
who could provide the jury with material 
evidence is one factor you may consider 
when weighing their credibility. The 
jury should view with caution such testimony 
if you find that the witness could have made 
themselves [sic] available for trial. 
Record at 84. Appellants assert they were denied due 
process of law by Judge Leary's refusal to give that 
instruction. They cite as authority for that proposition 
the footnote 20 comment in Justice Harlan's concurrence in 
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 186, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 
1950 (1970). 
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Respondent has been unable to locate a holding 
by any court that mandates the type of cautionary 
instruction that Justice Harlan proposed, and appellants 
cite no case authority requiring that type of instruction. 
Further, as is apparent from Justice Harlan's language 
cited by appellants, the instruction he envisioned was 
a rather general caveat to the jury regarding all types 
of hearsay evidence. The language of the instruction 
requested here appears to be an inappropriate comment 
on the evidence in the case. It also asks the jury to 
make a determination of potential availability, a 
preliminary determination properly the responsibility of 
the trial judge (see Point I, Part A). 
Although respondent was unable to locate any cases 
dealing specifically with cautionary instructions as to 
hearsay, several cases have dealt with instructions 
regarding the credibility of certain categories of 
witnesses. State v. Smith, 88 N.M. 541, 543 P.2d 834 
(App. 1975), upheld the trial court's refusal to give a 
cautionary instruction to treat "with a great deal of care 
and circumspection" the testimony of a witness granted 
immunity. The court stated: 
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(1) there is no requirement that an 
instruction be given concerning weighing 
the testimony of particular categories of 
witnesses; (2) the validity of special 
instructions concerning the evaluation of 
certain witnesses is doubtful; and (3) the 
basic instruction on credibility of 
witnesses sufficiently instructs on 
witness evaluation. 
543 P.2d at 840. The general propriety of cautionary 
instructions as to witness credibility is a matter for 
the trial court. State v. Boetger, 96 Idaho 535, 531 
P.2d 1180 (1975); Land v. People, 171 Colo. 114, 465 
P.2d 124 (1970); State v. Huff_, 76 Wash.2d 577, 458 
P.2d 180 (1969). 
Respondent submits that Judge Leary sufficiently 
instructed the jury as to their exclusive duty to judge 
the credibility of the witnesses in the preliminary instruc-
tions (R.91) and in the final instructions (R.100, 101). 
Further, the jury was clearly instructed on the defense 
theory of the case (R.108,109). Taken as a whole, the 
instructions given in this case adequately and 
appropriately informed the jury of the applicable law 
and their duty under that law (R.88-115). 
Respondent submits that appellants' claim of 
abuse of discretion is sirnply without merit. 
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l 
CONCLUSION 
Admission at trial of the recorded preliminary 
hearing testimony of the victims did not deny appellants' 
right to confrontation because the witnesses were consti-
tutionally unavailable and their testimony was obtained 
under circumstances bearing sufficient indicia of 
reliability. The evidence presented at trial was sufficient 
to support the jury verdict. The trial court committed no 
abuse of discretion in refusing appellants' requested 
instruction. 
For the foregoing reasons, respondent 
respectfully prays for an order from this Court upholding 
the verdicts of the jury and affirming the judgments and 
sentences entered in the court below. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
ROBERT N. PARRISH 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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